The plan is published in the NY Times with the intention to garner unwarranted attention. For one thing, since the White House regards the Surge as a stunning success, it’s natural that Kagan and O’Hanlon will receive a sympathetic ear.

And though their counsel is singularly lacking in rational approach and denies the right to self defense and self determination to yet another nation, a president with little interest in the rights and freedom is unlikely to notice its absence.

Kegan and O’Hanlon don’t have a plan other then the dream of American military salvation through collaborators and traitors referred to in the op-ed as pro-America moderates. In their rumination, presented a s a plan, the duo says: "Given the degree to which Pakistani nationalists cherish these assets, it is unlikely the United States would get permission to destroy them. Somehow, American forces would have to team with Pakistanis to secure critical sites and possibly to move the material to a safer place." What kind of Pakistanis are they expecting to team up with the invading armies?

In their wishful thinking the authors of the plan for invasion of Pakistan assume that Pakistan’s military will be totally in favor of the invasion and support the invading armies: "So, if we got a large number of troops into the country, what would they do? The most likely directive would be to help Pakistan’s military and security forces hold the country’s center — primarily the region around the capital, Islamabad, and the populous areas like Punjab Province to its south."

The plan is not sure how American forces will be welcomed by Pakistan army, but says "somehow" the invading armies "would have to team up with Pakistanis." Somehow is how in search of a plan. However, that is not a matter for concern for warlords in the US and other Western capitals who believe as long as the objective is clear (target Pakistan’s nuclear power), the how aspect will be taken care of somehow. However, we know from the Us experience of mass killings to the level of genocide in Iraq that it is not always as simple to invade a country as easily and these warmongers present.

Of course there are sellouts everywhere and the greedy and opportunist Pakistani generals may already have revealed the locations of critical sites to their overbearing American masters. Still the scenario of invasion and capturing the prized weapons would not be as simple as we read in the pages of the New York Times. No matter what the sold-out generals may have done at the top level, the idea that the Pakistani military as a whole will cooperate or any faction within it would in effect hand over the prize jewels of Pakistan’s national defense for American safekeeping — even if that was in "a remote redoubt within Pakistan" — is laughable.

The junior officers have no option but to obey their commanders at the top. However, when they realize that their top leadership is colluding with the United States for invading Pakistan and destroying of removing its nuclear weapons, the revolution/revolt in Pakistan army would be nothing less than hell for a few generals at the top. The US warmongers might see up in smoke all the military discipline we see now. They might see the traitors hanged in the streets in Pakistan.   There can be little doubt that American officials have already been provided with multiple assurances that the Generals command is the last command and everyone else down the ranks will obey. However there is no guarantee that the thousands of juniors officers would remain loyal even when they see the writing on the wall. 

As David Sanger and William Broad noted in the New York Times (Nov 18, 2007) a U.S. sponsored, post-9/11 plan to safeguard Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, "has been hindered by a deep suspicion among Pakistan’s military that the secret goal of the United States was to gather intelligence about how to locate and, if necessary, disable Pakistan’s arsenal, which is the pride of the country." 

So, it would seem that while Washington indulges in hair brain schemes for safeguarding Pakistani nukes, Pakistan’s military is not as concerned about the myth of these weapons falling into the hands of militants as they are fearful of America using Pakistan’s engineered instability as a ruse for implementing a unilateral disarmament scheme.

Kagan and O’Hanlon, sensing that pro-American Pakistanis might be in short supply, have nevertheless devised a Plan B — sort of. This one requires, "a sizable combat force — not only from the United States, but ideally also other Western powers and moderate Muslim nations." The American warlords are confident that the "longstanding effectiveness of Pakistan’s security forces," will provide sufficient time for a U.S.-led coalition to be deployed. They must remember that no "moderate Muslim" state came to help the US in its war for chemical and biological weapons in Iraq. How and from where would they come to the rescue of the Islamophobic allies in the case of a new war on a nuclear armed Muslim state?  

Now we get to the really interesting passage, indicating that the Iraq war supporters have made great progress on the Middle East plan in which Pakistan is also divided with parts of it going to Afghanistan and the emergence of an independent Baluchistan: "…if we got a large number of troops into the country, what would they do? The most likely directive would be to help Pakistan’s military [assuming it is working with the invaders] and security forces hold [just] the country’s center — primarily the region around the capital, Islamabad, [Pakistan’s Green Zone] and the populous areas like Punjab Province to its south. [Leaving Baluchistan, NWFP and Sindh alone for redrawing the new Middle East map, which interestingly included South Asia as well. See Ralph Peters, Armed Forces Journal - June 2006]

The war rhetoric surrounds the slogans that the "task of retaking any such regions and reclaiming custody of any nuclear weapons would be a priority for our troops." Hoever, the reality conceded by the authors is telling. They are simply bringing the grand design for undermining Pakistan – of which supporting tyrannical rule in Pakistan was one of the key components for seeding crisis and chaos - to the forefront for discussion and consensus building. Now all those Democrats who said Iraq was a distraction from the war on terrorism will be forced on board. Who could guess a few years ago that an engineered, chaotic fall of Musharraf would provide such a golden opportunity to the warlords in Washington? 

In the plans of American warlords, the time for Pakistan is up. It is up to Pakistan’s religious, military and political "leaders," who have facilitated the neocons plans thus far, to take a note of the impending war on Pakistan, make necessary course corrections, or get ready to be decimated with the rest of their countrymen or hanged in the streets in case they survive the shock and awe.   

Abid Ullah Jan is the author of The Musharraf Factor: Leading Pakistan to its Inevitable Demise.