July 5, 2006
Robert Dreyfuss is the author of Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam (Henry
Holt/Metropolitan Books, 2005). Dreyfuss is a freelance writer based in
Alexandria, Va., who specializes in politics and national security
issues. He is a contributing editor at The Nation, a contributing writer at Mother Jones, a senior correspondent for The American Prospect, and a frequent contributor to Rolling Stone. He can be reached through his website: www.robertdreyfuss.com.
The events in Iraq during the past week make it
clear, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that neither the Bush
administration nor its puppet Shiite theocrats in Iraq want peace.
Ten days ago, the U.S.-installed government of Prime Minister Nuri
al-Maliki made a grand show of offering "national reconciliation" with
the Iraqi insurgency. In what seemed at first to be an olive branch to
the insurgents, Maliki began dropping hints that the regime in Baghdad
might offer a package deal to the resistance, including a broad amnesty
for armed, anti-occupation fighters and an outreach to the deposed
Iraqi Baath party. It was, according to Maliki and to Ambassador Zalmay
Khalilzad, a sincere effort to strike a deal that could end the
fighting in Iraq and which conceivably could lead to the withdrawal of
U.S. forces.
Last week, in this space,
I wrote skeptically about the thin possibility that Maliki might strike
a deal with the resistance. By now, it is obvious that the
Maliki-Khalilzad supposed reconciliation plan was no such thing.
Khalilzad, President Jalal Talabani and Maliki have been conducting
on-again, off-again talks with parts of the Iraqi resistance for at
least a year, but appear to have no intention of offering the insurgent
groups a deal they can accept. Instead, Khalilzad and the leaders of
the Iraq government are engaged in a cynical, divide-and-conquer
maneuver that can only guarantee the war in Iraq will grind on for
years.
Last Sunday, when Maliki released his much-anticipated
reconciliation plan, it was vague and insubstantial. Maliki mentioned
"amnesty," but the amnesty he offered did not extend to those doing the
fighting. He included no outreach to the Baathists—who are at the heart
of the resistance—and not a hint that a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq is on
the table. Instead, Maliki simply asked the fighters to lay down their
arms, and he called on Sunni tribal and clan leaders and Sunni Arab
political blocs to join the Baghdad regime. It was a warmed over, but
still very stale version of repeated calls by the U.S. occupation
authorities and their Iraqi allies for an unconditional surrender by
the resistance.
According to reports in the media, the fact that the reconciliation
plan didn’t include anything new was the result of pressure on the
Iraqi government by the U.S. embassy and the American military command.
For a few days, hope fluttered in some quarters, sparked by reports
that as many as seven Iraqi insurgent groups had responded positively
to Maliki’s plan. Perhaps for the first time in three years, it seemed
possible that an end to the war was in sight.
But as details of the plan became clear, the idea of national
reconciliation was rejected virtually unanimously by the Iraqi
resistance. By the end of the week, the Sunni leaders in Iraq closest
to the insurgency were all reporting that the Maliki plan was dead.
Hareth al-Dari, a leader of the Association of Muslim Scholars, said
bluntly: "The main resistance factions have rejected [the plan]," and
he called it "nothing but a public relations plan to brighten the image
of the government." Added Hussein Falluji, a Sunni member of
parliament: "The major factions have refused this initiative … This
reconciliation plan is only in the prime minister’s mind. It was born
dead."
More bluntly, Maliki’s plan was denounced by resistance leaders on
the Internet—and the resistance answered Maliki with a devastating wave
of violence, car bombs, and intensified attacks on U.S. forces. Not
only that, but for the very first time a Shiite resistance group made
itself known. The new Shiite force, called the "Islamic Army in Iraq:
Abbas Brigades," is apparently not linked to any of the ruling Shiite
religious parties, including the often independent-minded forces allied
with Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, and its call to arms echoed the line
of the mostly Sunni-led resistance. Iraq, said the Abbas Brigades, is
occupied by an American force which is "building bases [and] sowing
sectarian sedition between Sunnis and Shiites, Arabs and Kurds." It
pledged attacks on U.S. troops.
Khalilzad and Maliki didn’t bother disguising their ploy. Ambassador Khalilzad chose David Ignatius of The Washington Post to deliver his cynical message that
the entire Maliki reconciliation plan is only an effort to co-opt
malleable—or gullible—parts of the resistance. In a phone call to
Ignatius, Khalilzad announced that he—and Maliki—were pushing for
"conditional amnesty for Iraqi insurgents as part of a broader
reconciliation effort, and negotiations with insurgent groups about
terms and conditions for ending the fighting." But he also made clear
that he was not talking about a blanket peace accord but merely
"outreach to elements of the Sunni insurgency that (in theory) can be
co-opted." Even more stark was Charles Krauthammer, the militantly
pro-war neoconservative, who authored a Post op-ed entitled "Amnesty for Insurgents? Yes." In it, he wrote:
The insurgency continues, and it is not going to be defeated
militarily. But that does not mean we lose. Insurgencies can be undone
by being co-opted. And that is precisely the strategy of Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki. … In Iraq, amnesty will necessarily be part of any
co-optation strategy in which insurgents lay down their arms. …
Reconciliation-cum-amnesty gets disaffected Iraqi Sunni tribes to come
over to the government's side.
Khalilzad and Maliki may yet offer what the American ambassador
calls a "conditional amnesty" to Sunnis who agree to accept Maliki’s
terms. Problem is, no credible leader of the resistance in Iraq can
accept the deal offered by Khalilzad and Maliki, and in fact, if they
do so they will be painting a bulls-eye on their foreheads, since they
will instantly become targets of the resistance themselves.
Ironically, in response to Maliki’s less-than-forthcoming
initiative, what appears to be a majority bloc of the Iraqi resistance
made an offer of their own. The resistance, they said, would halt the
fighting, stopping all attacks on U.S. occupation forces and the Iraqi
government, in exchange for a U.S. pledge to leave Iraq in two years.
For the United States, fighting a war-without-end in Iraq, that ought
to have been seen as a good deal. But it was rejected out of hand.
The offer by the resistance, a ceasefire in exchange for an end to
the occupation in 2008, also got little U.S. media attention. And,
although I may have missed it, not a single U.S. political leader from
the left nor those who are calling for a U.S. withdrawal—not Russ
Feingold, not John Kerry, not Jack Murtha—took note of the offer. None
had the guts to say to Bush: we ought to accept this deal. No editorial
writer at the New York Times took up his pen to support it.
No thinktanker at the Brookings Institution or the Center for American
Progress had the courage to say: "What the Iraqi resistance is saying
is a good idea."
Meanwhile, back in Iraq, Maliki made it clear exactly what
"conditional amnesty" means. While offering to talk to Sunni tribal
elders and to minor elements of the resistance that he believes he can
co-opt, the government of Iraq issued "Wanted" notices and rewards for
41 resistance leaders. It was a bitter irony. The list of 41 was a
Who’s Who of the Iraqi resistance; in other words, the regime was
offering rewards of up to $10 million for the capture or killing of
precisely the people it ought to be negotiating a truce with! Among
them were Raghad Hussein, the daughter of Saddam, who is living in
Jordan; Saddam’s wife, Sajida Hussein, who lives in Qatar; Izzat
Ibrahim al-Douri, a former top Iraqi official who is widely believed to
be a leader of the underground; and at least a dozen other top former
Baathists, Iraqi military and intelligence officials, and others. The
issuance of the list underscored the fact that neither Khalilzad nor
Maliki are seeking a deal with the real Iraqi resistance, merely
attempting to corral a few more stray Sunni leaders into the regime.
The list of 41 received an immediate rebuke from Jordan. Since 2003,
Raghad Hussein has lived in Jordan under the protection of the
government of Jordan and King Abdullah. Asked whether Jordan would turn
her over to the Iraqi government, Amman slapped Baghdad in the face. A
spokesman for the king of Jordan said bluntly: "She is the guest of the
Hashemite royal family."
The Jordanians added that, in their opinion, Raghad is not violating
the terms of her asylum agreement, according to which she is supposed
to refrain from political activity. Of course, it is widely believed
that she, along with many other top Iraqi officials in Jordan, are
helping to direct, support and finance the Iraqi resistance. Although
the Jordanian government prefers to maintain the polite fiction that
Iraq’s resistance has no base in Jordan, it does. And Jordan’s rebuff
of Iraq means that even this erstwhile American ally is prepared to
challenge the U.S.-Iraqi regime of quislings in Baghdad.
Jordan’s stance makes it even clearer that no end to the fighting
can occur until and unless an international conference is convened to
involve Iraq’s neighbors (including Iran), the Arab League, and the
United Nations (including Russia and China) in helping to stabilize
Iraq politically. Part One of ending the war is a deal with the
resistance, and Part Two is the internationalization of the peace. So
far, there is not the slightest hope that the Bush administration is
prepared to accept either. "We will stay. We will fight. And we will
prevail," Bush told troops at Fort Bragg on Sunday.
And if the leaked audio from an encounter between Secretary of State
Condi Rice and Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is any
indication, the United States is stonewalling any international role in
Iraq, too. When Lavrov suggested an international effort to help
stabilize Iraq, Rice explicitly rejected the idea of other countries
getting involved. There followed this sobering, and testy, exchange:
Lavrov: What I did say was … the involvement of the international community in support of the political process.
Rice: What does that mean?
Lavrov: [Long pause.] I think you know.
Rice: No. I don’t.
But Rice understands all too well, and she (like her boss) rejects
anything that undermines U.S. primacy in Iraq. That, as President Bush
indicates, means continued war. In a rare moment of candor, an American
military man declared last week what continued war means. "It’s my
belief that we are going to be in Iraq for a long time," said Lt. Gen.
Martin Dempsey. "It’s open-ended."