July 5, 2006
The Destabilization Game
By Tom Engelhardt
One of these days, some scholar will do a little history of the odd
moments when microphones or recording systems were turned on or left
on, whether on purpose or not, and so gave us a bit of history in the
raw. We have plenty of American examples of this phenomenon, ranging
from the secret White House recordings of President John F. Kennedy's
meetings with his advisers during the Cuban Missile Crisis (so
voluminous as to become multi-volume publications)
and Richard Nixon's secret tapes (minus those infamous 18½ minutes),
voluminous enough so that you could spend the next 84 days nonstop
listening to what's been made publicly available, to the moment in 1984 when a campaigning President Ronald_Reagan quipped
on the radio during a microphone check (supposedly unaware that it was
on): "My fellow Americans, I'm pleased to tell you today that I've
signed legislation that will outlaw Russia forever. We begin bombing in
five minutes."
Just last week, a lovely little example of this sort of thing came our
way and, twenty-two years after Ronald Reagan threatened to atomize the
"evil empire," Russia was still the subject. Last Thursday, at a
private lunch of G-8 foreign ministers in Moscow, an audio link to the
media was left on, allowing reporters to listen in on a running series
of arguments (or as the Washington Post's Glenn Kessler
put it, "several long and testy exchanges") between U.S. Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov over
a collective document no one would remember thenceforth
The whole event was a grim, if minor, comedy of the absurd. According to the Post
account, "Reporters traveling with Rice transcribed the tape of the
private luncheon but did not tell Rice aides about it until after a
senior State Department official, briefing reporters on condition of
anonymity as usual, assured them that 'there was absolutely no friction
whatsoever' between the two senior diplomats." (What better reminder do
we need that so much anonymous sourcing granted by newspapers turns out
to be a mix of unreliable spin and outright lies readers would be
better off without?) In, as Kessler wrote, "a time of rising tension in
U.S.-Russian relations," the recording even caught "the clinking of ice
in glasses and the scratch of cutlery on plates," not to speak of the
intense irritation of both parties.
"Sometimes the tone smacked of the playground" is the way a British report
summed the encounter up, but decide for yourself. Here's a sample of
what "lunch" sounded like -- the context of the discussion was Iraq
(especially outrage over the kidnapping and murder of four employees of
the Russian embassy in Baghdad):
"Rice said she worried [Lavrov] was suggesting greater international involvement in Iraq's affairs.
"'I did not suggest this,' Lavrov said. 'What I did say was not
involvement in the political process but the involvement of the
international community in support of the political process.'
"'What does that mean?' Rice asked.
"There was a long pause. 'I think you understand,' he said.
"'No, I don't,' Rice said.
"Lavrov tried to explain, but Rice said she was disappointed. 'I
just want to register that I think it's a pity that we can't endorse
something that's been endorsed by the Iraqis and the U.N.,' she said,
adding tartly: 'But if that's how Russia sees it, that's fine.'"
Behind Rice's irritation certainly lay a bad few Russia weeks for the
administration. Not only had the Russians been flexing their energy
muscles of late, consorting with the Chinese
and various of the Soviet Union's former Soviet Socialist Republics in
Central Asia, which the Bush administration covets for their energy
resources; but, as the ministers were meeting, Russian President
Vladimir Putin -- you remember, another one of those world leaders
George Bush "looked in the eyes" and found to be "trustworthy" (but that was so long ago) -- made it frustratingly clear that he would not back
U.S. moves against neighboring Iran and its putative nuclear program at
the UN. "'We do not intend to join any sort of ultimatum, which only
pushes the situation into a dead end, striking a blow against the
authority of the UN Security Council,' Putin told Russian diplomats in
Moscow in the presence of journalists. 'I am convinced that dialogue
and not isolation of one or another state is what leads to resolution
of crises.'"
Destabilizing Russia
There is, however, a larger, far more perilous context within which
to view the "testy" relationship between the two former Cold War
superpowers and, for once, someone has managed to lay it out
brilliantly, connecting the dots for the rest of us. In The New American Cold War, the cover story of the most recent Nation
magazine, Russia specialist Stephen F. Cohen finally catches the
essence of that ever degrading relationship. What Cohen points out is
that, after the USSR unraveled, the Cold War never actually ended, not
on the American side anyway, and today it not only continues at nearly
full blast, but the Russians have finally reentered the game.
To offer a little context: In the early years of the Cold War, when the
A-bomb and then the H-bomb were briefly American monopolies, there
were, among American hardliners, those who, in the phrase of the time,
wanted to "rollback" the Soviet Union in whatever fashion necessary. At
an extreme, as early as 1950, the Strategic Air Command's Gen. Curtis
LeMay urged the implementation of SAC Emergency War Plan I-49, which
involved delivering a first strike of "the entire stockpile of atomic
bombs… in a single massive attack," some 133 A-bombs on 70 Soviet
cities in 30 days. However, it was another policy, "containment" (first
suggested by diplomat George Kennan in his famous "long telegram" from
Moscow and then in his 1947 essay, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct,"
written under the pseudonym "Mr. X" in Foreign Affairs
magazine), that took hold. Increasingly, as the years went by, as
superpower nuclear arsenals came ever closer to parity, the U.S. and
the USSR settled into the equivalent of family life together, bickering
(at the cost of untold numbers of dead) only on the borderlands of
their respective empires. In the later 1960s, containment became détente.
When Ronald Reagan won the presidency in 1980 and relaunched the Cold
War against the "evil empire," matters threatened to change, but in the
end -- despite a massive rearmament campaign (that began in the Carter
years) and the launching of Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative
("Star Wars"), meant to militarize space, détente hung in there;
finally, to the surprise of all American strategists, the Berlin Wall
came down and the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe quickly unraveled
without opposition from the remarkable Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev
(a rare instance of the head of an imperial order not turning to force
as it was dismantled). After a moment's hesitation, America's cold
warriors, including the massively funded intelligence community which
had never so much as suspected the weakened state of the Soviet Union,
declared global victory. Much of the rest of the story (the lack of a
"peace dividend," the rise of the U.S. as the globe's supposed sole
"hyperpower," the way the neoconservatives and others fell in love
with American military might and its potential ability to alter the
world in directions they passionately desired is now reasonably well
known – except for the very large piece of the puzzle Cohen contributed
last week.
In his essay, Cohen points out that Russia, despite recent gains, is
still in "an unprecedented state of peacetime demodernization and
depopulation," suffering "wartime death and birth rates" in a time of
relative peace; while its unstable political system rests on the
popularity of one man, Vladimir Putin. What was left of the USSR having
almost imploded in the 1990s, he writes, even today we cannot be sure
what the collapse of a power armed with every imaginable weapon of mass
destruction might "mean for the rest of the world."
How, he asks, has every U.S. administration reacted to this globally perilous situation?
"Since the early 1990s Washington has simultaneously
conducted, under Democrats and Republicans, two fundamentally different
policies toward post-Soviet Russia -- one decorative and outwardly
reassuring, the other real and exceedingly reckless. The decorative
policy, which has been taken at face value in the United States, at
least until recently, professes to have replaced America's previous
cold war intentions with a generous relationship of 'strategic
partnership and friendship'… The real US policy has been very different
-- a relentless, winner-take-all exploitation of Russia's post-1991
weakness. Accompanied by broken American promises, condescending
lectures and demands for unilateral concessions, it has been even more
aggressive and uncompromising than was Washington's approach to Soviet
Communist Russia… [This policy includes a] growing military
encirclement of Russia, on and near its borders, by US and NATO bases,
which are already ensconced or being planned in at least half the
fourteen other former Soviet republics, from the Baltics and Ukraine to
Georgia, Azerbaijan and the new states of Central Asia. The result is a
US-built reverse iron curtain and the remilitarization of
American-Russian relations."
Destabilizing Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and the United States
This is the new, American-driven cold war -- a striking feature of our
landscape, almost utterly ignored by the mainstream media -- that Cohen
lays out at length and in compelling detail. Since 2000, these new cold
war policies have only taken a turn for the disastrous. From its first
moments in office, the Bush administration, made up almost solely of
rabid former cold warriors, has been focused with an unprecedented
passion and intensity on what can only be called a "rollback" policy.
Defined a little more precisely, what they have pursued, as Cohen makes
clear, is a policy of Russian "destabilization" with every means at
their command -- and, until recently, with some success.
Their view was simple enough. In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet
empire, the United States was the sole military power of significance
left standing. It had, as they saw it, enough excess power to ensure a Pax Americana
into the distant future, in part by ensuring that no future or
resurgent superpower or bloc of powers would, in any foreseeable
future, arise to challenge the United States. As the President put it
in an address at West Point
in 2002, "America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond
challenge." The administration's new National Security Strategy of that
year seconded the point, adding that the country must be "strong enough
to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in
hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States."
This was to be accomplished by:
*ensuring that the former challenging superpower, once rolled back to
something like its pre-imperial boundaries, would never arise in any
significant new form from the rubble of its failed empire.
*ensuring that no new superpower would arise in economically
resurgent Asia; in this regard, the Chinese would be essentially hemmed
in, if not encircled, by American (and Japanese) power; a potentially
independent Taiwan supported; and the Japanese and Chinese set at each
others throats.
*ensuring that the oil heartlands of the planet in what was by then
being called an "arc of instability" running from the Central Asian
borderlands of Russia and China through the Middle East, North Africa
(later, much of the rest of Africa), all the way to Latin America would
be dotted with American military bases, anchored in the Middle East by
an emboldened Israel and new more pro-American and subservient regimes
in formerly enemy states like Iraq, Iran, and Syria, and that the
planet's oil flows (hence the fate of the industrialized and
industrializing parts of the planet) would remain under American
control.
The administration's destabilization strategy, as convincingly laid out
by Cohen, was not, however, limited to Russia. The ambitions of top
administration officials and their supporters, after all, were
world-spanning. (It wasn't for nothing that the neocons and allied
pundits began talking about us as the planet's New Rome back in 2002,
while we were tearing up treaties, setting up secret prisons, and
preparing to launch our first "preventive" war.) In retrospect, it
seems clear that destabilization was their modus operandi.
Despite what some have argued in relation to Iraq (and elsewhere in the
Middle East), they were undoubtedly not voting for chaos per se. What
they were eager to do was put the strategically most significant and
contested regions of the planet "in play," using the destabilization
card, always assuming in every destabilization situation that the chips
would fall on their side of the gaming table, and that, if worse came
to worse, even chaos would turn out to be to their benefit.
In that spirit, they began working to destabilize Russia, hoping
that even if "regime change" weren't possible, all sorts of energy
resources and other political and economic fruits would fall their way
from the rotting tree of the former Soviet Union. As we know, they
didn't hesitate to do the same in Afghanistan, claiming that they were
simply taking out al-Qaeda and its Taliban hosts (with whom they had,
not so long before, been in pipeline negotiations).
What they actually did, however, was settle in to that country for the
long haul, setting up their normal run of bases and prisons, and in the
process not fretting enormously about what destabilization was actually
doing there -- creating a narco-warlord-Taliban failed state that now,
of course, befuddles them.
Then, as we all know, they invaded Iraq, claiming they were pursuing
Saddam Hussein's nonexistent WMD program via "decapitation"
shock-and-awe attacks on his regime, the disbanding of his military,
the dissolution of the Baath Party, the disbarment of many of its
former members from office or jobs, and the dismantling of the
state-organized and run economy -- a program of destabilization
so sweeping as to take one's breath away and meant to launch a far more
sweeping destabilization (and hence remaking) of the Middle East. The
results of this project, still in progress, are by now well known --
including the fostering of a complex, bloodthirsty, sectarian
bloodletting in Iraq which now threatens to spill across borders into
neighboring lands (along with terrorism and oil sabotage).
Their most recent target is Iran -- or rather, ostensibly, Iran's
nuclear energy program. In his latest report on the administration's
Iranian policy, New Yorker journalist Seymour Hersh quotes a "high-ranking general"
this way: "[T]he military's experience in Iraq, where intelligence on
weapons of mass destruction was deeply flawed, has affected its
approach to Iran. 'We built this big monster with Iraq, and there was
nothing there. This is son of Iraq.'" In fact, as Hersh has previously reported,
administration strategists have long been trying to destabilize Iran in
a variety of ways, while threatening future military assaults on that
country's nuclear establishment. If, at some future point, they were to
follow through on this, the results for the global economy would
undoubtedly prove both staggering and destabilizing in ways it's quite
possible no one could handle.
In the meantime, they have been willing to destabilize the world by
essentially growing terror in the pursuit of other ends. Despite the
centrality of the "global war on terror" to their plans, it's obvious
that the taking out of hostile terrorist groups has not been the only,
or even perhaps the primary item on their agenda -- after all, they
curtailed the hunt for Osama bin Laden in order to whack Iraq. Rhetoric
aside, they seem, in fact, to be quite willing to live with the global
phenomenon of ever proliferating, ever more homegrown terrorist
organizations.
Though it's been little noted, their program in the United States has
been hardly less based on playing the destabilization card. As their
minions in occupied Iraq were intent on radically "privatizing" -- that
is, destabilizing -- the Iraqi government and economy, so they have
been intent on radically privatizing (and destabilizing) the American
government and economy. Recently, Frank Rich of the New York Times wrote a striking column, The Road from K Street to Yusufiya,
on exactly this, pointing out that "nearly 40 cents of every dollar in
federal discretionary spending now goes to private companies." It
hardly mattered to them that they were essentially emptying civil
government of its can-do powers; that they were replacing those hated
bureaucrats in Washington with even less competent bureaucrats linked
to private, crony corporations of their choice. As Rich put the matter:
"[T]he Bush brand of competitive sourcing, with its
get-rich-quick schemes and do-little jobs for administration pals,
spread like a cancer throughout the executive branch. It explains why
tens of thousands of displaced victims of Katrina are still living in
trailer shantytowns all these months later. It explains why New York
City and Washington just lost 40 percent of their counterterrorism
funds. It helps explain why American troops are more likely to be
slaughtered than greeted with flowers more than three years after the
American invasion of Iraq.
"The Department of Homeland Security, in keeping with the Bush
administration's original opposition to it, isn't really a government
agency at all so much as an empty shell, a networking boot camp for
future private contractors dreaming of big paydays…"
Caesar's Palace
The top officials of this administration are remarkable gamblers and
optimists. They have also proven remarkably single-minded in playing
the destabilization game. If they are in the Roman-Empire business,
don't think Augustus, think Caesar's Palace.
Like so many gambling addicts, they've never run across a situation in
which they're unwilling to roll the dice, no matter the odds. They just
give those dice that special little rub and offer a prayer for good
luck, always knowing that this just has to be their day.
Medicare, roll the dice. Social security, roll the dice. Tax the poor
and middle class by untaxing the rich, no problem. Wipe out what's left
of the checks and balances of the American system in favor of a theory
of an all-encompassing "commander-in-chief" government, roll those
dice. Launch endless, Swift-Boat-style, bare-knuckle campaigns of fear,
lies, and fantasy (accompanied by gerrymandering and vote-suppression
schemes) meant to install Republicans in power for decades to come, no
matter the cost to the political system -- don't wait, toss 'em now!
This is, essentially, a full-scale a program for the destabilization
(as well as plundering) of this country, one that fits snugly with
their operations potentially destabilizing the planet. And through it
all, like the good cold warriors they are, they've never let up on that
rollback campaign against Russia. Perhaps, as in the previous century,
if all that needed to be compared was the relative powers of two
superpowers, their acts, however fierce or cruel, might not have seemed
so strategically wrongheaded. Having taken advantage of the weaknesses
of their opposite number, administration officials might now be
standing tall; while the Russians, crimped, impoverished, embittered,
might indeed have been licking their wounds, while complaining angrily
but impotently.
Such is not the case. The twenty-first century is already turning out
to be far more than a hyperpower, or even a two superpower, world.
Before the eyes of much of humanity, between November 2001 and March
2003, the Bush administration decided to demonstrate its singular
strength by playing its destabilization trump card and setting in
motion the vaunted military power of the United States. To the
amazement of almost all, that military, destructive as it proved to be,
was stopped in its tracks by two of the less militarily impressive
"powers" on this planet -- Afghanistan and Iraq.
Before all eyes, including those of George, Dick, Don, Paul, Stephen,
Condi, and their comrades, we visibly grew weaker. While the Bush
administration was coveting what the Russians called their "near abroad"
-- all those former SSRs around its rim -- and were eagerly peeling
them away with "orange," "rose," and "tulip" revolutions, its own "near
abroad" (what we used to like to call our Latin "backyard") was peeling
away of its own accord, without the aid of a hostile superpower. This
would once have been inconceivable, as would another reality --
up-and-coming economic powers like China and India traveling to that
same "backyard" looking for energy deals. And yet a destabilized planet
invariably means a planet of opportunity for someone.
In fact, Iraq proved such a black hole, so destabilizing for the Bush
administration itself that its officials managed to look the other way
while China emerged as an organizing power and economic magnet in Asia
(a process from which the U.S. was increasingly excluded) and Russian
energy reserves gave Putin and pals a new lease on life. Now,
administration officials find themselves stunned by the results, which
are not likely to be ameliorated by floating a bunch of aircraft-carrier task forces menacingly in the western Pacific.
In one of his recent commentaries, historian Immanuel Wallerstein pointed out that the "American Century," proclaimed by Time and Life Magazine
owner Henry Luce in 1943, lasted far less than the expected hundred
years. Now, the question -- and except for a few "declinist" scholars
like Wallerstein, it would have been an unimaginable one as recently as
2003 -- is: "Whose century is the twenty-first century?" His grim
answer: It will be the century of "multi-polar anarchy and wild
economic fluctuations."
If you think about it, the single greatest destabilizing gamble this
administration has taken has also been the least commented upon. A
couple of years back "global warming" was largely a back-page story
about tribal peoples having their habitats melted in the far north or
finding their islands in danger of flooding somewhere in the distant
Pacific. It was all ice all the time and if you didn't live near a
glacier or somewhere in the tundra, it didn't have much to do with you
-- and certainly nothing whatsoever to do with those nasty hurricanes that seemed to be increasing in strength in the Atlantic as were typhoons in the Pacific.
Now, global warming is front-page stuff and you don't have to go far to
find it. Alaska isn't just melting any more, we are. Lately, a plethora
of major stories and prime-time TV news reports have regularly talked
not about the north, but about the planet "running a slight fever from greenhouse gases," or undergoing unexpectedly "abrupt" climate change, or of the U.S. itself having its warmest years in its history -- something reflected even in local headlines (For N. Texas,
it's warmest year on record). And yet in our media the Bush
administration still largely gets a free pass on the subject. No major
cover stories are yet taking on the ultimate destabilization gamble of
this administration, the fact that they are playing not just with the
fate of this or that superpower or set of minor powers, but with that
of the human race itself.
The willingness of the President and his officials to bet the store on
the possibility that global warming doesn't exist, or won't hit as
ferociously as expected, or soon enough to affect them, or will be
solved by some future quick-fix still isn't thought of as real
front-page news. In other words, their maddest gamble of all, next to
which the destabilization of Iran or Russia dwindles to nothing,
receives little attention. And yet, based on their track record, we
know just what they are going to do -- throw those dice again.
For George W. Bush and his top officials, taking the long-term heat on
this probably isn't really an issue. They have the mentality not just
of gamblers but of looters and in a couple of years, if worse comes to
worse, they can head for Crawford or Wyoming or estates and ranches
elsewhere to hunt fowl and drink mai tais. It's the rest of us, and
especially our children and grandchildren, who will still be here on
this destabilized, energy-hungry planet without an air conditioner in
sight.
Tom Engelhardt, who runs the Nation Institute's Tomdispatch.com ("a
regular antidote to the mainstream media"), is the co-founder of the American Empire Project and the author of The End of Victory Culture, a history of American triumphalism in the Cold War. His novel, The Last Days of Publishing, is now out in paperback.
Copyright 2006 Tom Engelhardt
|