July 10, 2006


Is "reconciliation" possible with the men who raped your daughters, poisoned your water, looted your museums, leveled your cities, bombed your holy sites, tortured and killed your friends and neighbors, and toppled your government?

George Bush seems to think so; that’s why he’s pushing the plan through his Baghdad stooge, Prime Minister Nuir al-Maliki. But, I would offer this one word of caution to the "war president":

Don’t bet on it.

There have been numerous communiqués from the Iraqi resistance on the internet, but they can all be reduced to one simple 2-word message: "Get out".

That’s it. "Get off my land and leave us alone"; that’s the bottom-line and it’s unlikely to change anytime soon.

Sure, Bush will probably dredge up some meager support from factions in the so-called "insurgency" who’ll give up the struggle for a spot at the political table, but as long as the occupation continues, the fighting will persist.

The "reconciliation plan" is being dressed up as a "political solution" and, in fact, it does have some redeeming aspects. It shows that the administration has finally realized that the war cannot be won militarily, but will only be ended through a negotiated settlement.

Bush can be expected to distance himself from the unpopular amnesty program while stealthily promoting it through his agents in the media and his Iraqi puppet, al Maliki. This has already begun to take place with political pundits like neocon Charles Krauthammer pitching amnesty from his perch at the Washington Post ("Amnesty " target="_new">www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/29/AR2
006062901790.html">"Amnesty will be an essential element in any reconciliation policy") and the other news services inserting it in their reports.

As Krauthammer readily admits, its merely an attempt to "co-opt" the resistance and, thereby, diminish their ability to attack US troops.

There are at least 4 reasons why this plan is likely to fail;
Falluja, Abu Ghraib, Haditha, and Mahmudiyah.

If similar war crimes had been perpetrated in the United States by an army of occupation, then every able-bodied man with any sense of decency would join the fight to defend his country. We should assume that the same rule applies to the Iraqis whose tribal loyalties make cohesion far more certain.

Amnesty is not the only nettlesome part of the reconciliation plan. There’s also the question of whether to "recognize the resistance" and a "timetable for withdrawal". If these demands sound a lot like "unconditional surrender" it’s because they are.

The "recognition of the resistance" forces Bush to acknowledge that the Ba’athist fighters who have been disparaged as "dead-enders and terrorists" have a legitimate role in the new Iraqi government. This is a real turn-around from the earlier policy of "de-Ba’athification". Rumsfeld’s shortsighted plan to purge Saddam’s regime of its Ba’ath Party members dismantled the civil service and sent-off thousands of minor government officials to join the resistance. It was a huge mistake that ultimately cost hundreds if not thousands of American lives.

The question of "recognizing the resistance" is fraught with difficulty. The two main players in this political-Kabuki are the US military and the Iraqi resistance. While it is impossible to defend the brutality of the Saddam regime, it is even more impossible to defend the legitimacy of the occupying power. Ideally, political power should be decided through the democratic process. Unfortunately, that will not happen in Iraq and the balloting was merely a public relations hoax intended to hoodwink the American people. The best we can hope for at this point is that a power-sharing agreement will be reached between the main groups (Shia, Sunnis, and Kurds) following the withdrawal of American troops. No matter what transpires, it will be preferable to occupation, which undermines the two essential cornerstones of statehood; national sovereignty and self-determination. Even the worst government has more inherent legitimacy than one that is controlled by an imperial power.

The question of a timetable for withdrawal is equally important. It has been reported that some of factions in the resistance have agreed to a 2 year timetable for the withdrawal of American troops. But, this sounds fishy. Why would resistance leaders allow Bush to skate through another election-cycle before forcing him to remove soldiers? It sounds like just more political manuvering by Karl Rove to trick the American public.

In fact, neither Bush nor the cadre of elite groups who support him has any intention of leaving Iraq. The global oil-scarcity (peak oil) ensures that Washington will never abandon its control of the vital resources in the Caspian Basin. Oil is indispensable if America plans to maintain its dominance as the world’s lone superpower. That means that the Bush must be wrangling a settlement by making promises that he has no intention of keeping. Meanwhile, the construction of the 9 permanent military bases and the $1 billion US embassy continues apace.

Will Bush be able to produce a peace agreement without physically removing the troops? It’s doubtful, but we should never underestimate the power of the Bush administration to resolve an issue through deceit.

In the long run, the reconciliation plan will have very little impact. It could bring about a temporary cease-fire or take some of the punch out of the resistance, but ultimately, it is bound to fail. The Bush administration is as incapable of negotiation as it is of keeping its word. Diplomacy is simply not in their repertoire and it is unreasonable to think that that will change.