January 8, 2007

At the beginning of the trial of Saddam Hussein a (strange!) explosion was heard in Baghdad. For foreign reporters who were not aware of Iraq history, the event was no different than any other explosion they heard in the post occupation period. The target of the explosion was a beautiful sculpture of Abou Jafar Al-Mansour; the Abbasid Caliph, who built Baghdad in 762, giving it the name of Dar al-Salam meaning "the home of peace." The "execution" of the Abou Jafar al Mansour sculpture was seen by some Iraqi politicians as an attempt to de-Arabize Iraq.

An Iraqi politician, Dhafer Al-Ani casts light on the broader perspective of this destruction, stating "They are wiping out every Arab Muslim historical site, but the sites which represent foreign occupation across history are being well looked after," he adds, "it is like the case with Taw Kisra, the palace of the Persian emperors who ruled Iraq between the third and sixth century."

To understand the extent to which the Al-Ani argument fits into the current Iraqi cultural and political scene, the first step is to find a possible linkage between the "execution" of the Abou Jafar Al Mansour sculpture and the political literature of who invaded and helped in the invasion of Iraq. The American administration said it invaded Iraq for two reasons: Iraq's atomic capability and Al-Qaeda connection neither were proven.

The previous Iraqi opposition which runs the current Iraqi government stood against the pan-Arab regime of Baghdad and allied politically with the USA-- a country that has a long record of supporting oppressive Arab regimes and the Israeli occupation, needs no further explanations. And ideologically, the Iraqi previous opposition who runs the current government allied with the Iranian regime, a state that has a shameful record when it comes to democracy.

From the very beginning of this invasion the United States viewed Iraq as a nation made up of various sects and ethnic groups: Sunni, Shi'i and Kurds. They fail to see Iraq as a nation of Iraqis. This policy was adopted by pro USA and pro Iran Iraqis even before the real invasion occurred. The Iraqi opposition in the London and Salahuddin conferences in the period prior to the occupation, sought to divide Iraq into three parts. The USA has created the socio-political conditions which allowed the Iraqi pro Iranian forces to realize the anti-Arab policy. This is evidenced by the pro-Iran government policy of rejecting to refer to the Arab identity of Iraq in the new constitution, and in the efforts to change the Iraqi flag and in adopting the law of outlawing the Ba'ath party, which was the maximization of the efforts to de-Arabizing Iraq. And, despite American Iranian differences on a number of issues, both interests are being met in Iraq. This situation has raised serious questions about the Iran policy in the Middle East. Before the American occupation, Iran had no influence in Iraq, but after the occupation, Iran is clearly the major beneficiary of the occupation. The aim here is not to create conspiracy theories about a secret alliance between the USA and Iran, because in my view that is pure imagination, but rather to see that their interests are both being served in Iraq. Perhaps it is an unexpected consequence born out of failure by the Bush administration to predict the outcome of the invasion.

Arab nationalism is the enemy of both the USA and consequently Israel and contradicts with the sectarian doctrine of Tehran which seeks to expand through exploiting the Arab Shi'i Muslim sentiments. Therefore the real Arab response to the USA and Iran is to construct democratic Arab regimes where all citizens are equal, regardless of faith or ethnicity. The absence of Arab solidarity and democracy will always be the holes from which the USA and Israel will penetrate.

The irony (to say the least) of the Iran policy can be clearly proved in comparing the situation in Iraq with Lebanon. In occupied Iraq, the pro Iranian forces are the pillars of the American occupation and the anti Arab forces, in Lebanon, which is not occupied, Iran supports Hizbullah, which is structurally a Muslim Shi'i party, but has an Arab and Pan Islamic discourse. This does not mean to equate Hizbullah with sectarian forces in Iraq, but rather to raise questions about the Iranian double standard policy in the Middle East. Yet it is important to stress that the real conflict is not between Arabs and Iran, the real enemy for Arabs is Israel and not Iran ,but Iran must know that inflaming sectarian sentiments in the region will harm its interest and cause inter Muslim strife which benefits no one except Israel.

Saddam Hussein's execution was far from building a democratic Iraq; it was not done on the grounds of executing a one man ruler, which charactarises many Arab regimes. It was done on the basis of the culture of revenge which appeared clearly in the process of the execution. The culture of revenge has drawn together all those who wanted the pan-Arab Iraq to die: the USA, Israel, and Iran, the Iraqi sectarian forces, the Arab narrow minded and middle-age Arab regimes that helped the USA to invade Iraq. In this situation, Hussein seems to be similar to the character of Santiago Nassar in the Marquez novel Chronicle of a Death Foretold, when every body knows that the murderers would kill Nassar. The only difference is that Nassar did not know that they planned to kill him, while Saddam knew. In my opinion, the decision to execute Hussein rested not with the court, but with the politicians who wanted to de- Arabize Iraq. The political forces who could not tolerate the sculpture of Abou Jafar Al-Mansour are those who wanted the Arab Iraq to disappear: even if Swiss or Norwegian judges had been brought in, the decision to execute had already been decided. The paradox of all this is that those who executed Saddam Hussein, rule Iraq through militia known for committing murder in the Iraqi prisons; they are far from being qualified to judge the Ba'ath regime.

A little known fact is that during a 2006 visit to Hussein, Donald Rumsfeld offered both him and his family asylum if he would publicly denounce the Iraqi resistance, specifically the Ba'athist resistance. The resistance fighters were to also lay down their weapons. Hussein rejected this deal outright, his rejection to this offer has given him a legendary position he couldn't ever have achieved in life.

In critical times, nations need tragic heroes whose death and national pride can be twinned.

The Syrian general Yousef Al-Adhama stood with few soldiers and died to defend Damascus while facing in Maysaloon the advanced French army in 1920,Yasser Arafat stood with few of his men when his headquarter at Al Muqata'a was attacked by hundreds of Israeli tanks and planes. Saddam refused to put the hood over his head before the hanging, while the executioners did in fact, choose to mask their faces. He knew that Baghdad which produced half of the Arab history worth to be defended. No doubt, Saddam Hussein made grave political mistakes, but like Gilgamesh in the ancient Babylon tragedy, he faced his fate bravely. This has provided the candles of Arab history fresh wax for the years to come. The historic Saddam is over and the legendary Saddam is born.