January 31, 2005

I think the apparent Shia-Sunni difference in voting trend is being misrepresented. Both the mainstream media along with the occupations' divisive plans and the so-called not-so-well-informed progressives unfortunately, will continue to misrepresent it in those terms. We need to be aware of playing into "their" hands.

It is easier and more natural to interpret voting trends in geographical and political rather than sectarian terms. I need to explain this by examples.

Turnout was extremely low in central areas altogether plus Basra marginally. It is easy to think of the almost total boycott of Ramadi & Sallahuddin provinces in Sunni terms alone, but this would be inaccurate.

Towns like Balad and Dijail (Shia) were not any different in total boycott from neighboring Samarra and Al-Dur (Sunni). There are towns that are predominantly Shia within the so-called Sunni triangle that behaved just like their Sunni neighbors.

Mosul and Kirkuk behaved similarly within their mostly Arab and Turkomen areas. Baquba is almost 50-50 with Kurdish minority. Again, Buhriz town (Shia) behaved like neighboring Baquba city itself (Sunni).

Baghdad has a small overall majority of Shia actually. Most areas are well integrated with a majority of this or that, apart from Sadr city that is clearly Shia. There were very slight differences in behavior in almost all areas. Moving furthest south to Basra (50-50), we observe similarity but to a lesser degree.

Consider that those areas contain about 60% of the population. With very little math, it can be seen that it must also include within it a large proportion of Shia and Kurds, as the Arab Sunnis cannot be more than 30% of the population by the most optimistic estimates.

Take Baghdad. Break the population (approx) down into 50% Shia, 40% Sunni, 10% Kurds & others. Did you get a turnout of 60%? Reliable accounts from the media and personal sources suggest 20% for Baghdad at most. What can we conclude from this?

The occupation acted to dismantle all forms of political structure deliberately to install its own alternatives. It continues to thwart voices of civil groups (unions, professionals, academics) apart from those pre-prepared collaborator expatriates who came in on the US tanks. After banning the Baath party, they refused room to other expatriate parties that opposed the invasion, as well as some indigenous national-platform movements formed after the invasion.

The occupation is promoting the idea that Iraq is a collection of sects and ethnic groups, and denies a national unifying theme to further its aims of control.

To get back to our point, the resistance is strongest in Baghdad and the more-developed central areas of Iraq, and other major urban centers like Basra and Amara in the south and Duhok in the Kurdish north.

It is weakest still in rural areas of the south and Kurdish north (mainly rural), where other forces are at work more prominently, where archaic feudal, tribal and reactionary religious forces are being bolstered incessantly.

Counter influences in the south include the strong sectarian influence of the Sistani school, which although is anti-occupation; it nevertheless gives higher priority to sectarian rather than national interests.

There is also the influence of SCIRI and Dawa parties that are closely linked to Iran and using Sistani's influence for their objectives. The Kurdish north has been under the influence of the two reactionary feudal parties since 1991, which has been time enough thanks to US backing for practically total separation of the region from the rest of Iraq.

It is naturally a complex scene, as any country would be under such circumstances.

You cannot begin to understand it by reading the western media, even most of the anti-war advocates that are still influenced by the strong prevailing current of unavoidable oversimplification and deliberate misrepresentation.